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ABSTRACT
By offering personalized content to users, recommender sys-
tems have become a vital tool in e-commerce and online
media applications. Content-based algorithms recommend
items or products to users, that are most similar to those
previously purchased or consumed. Unfortunately, collect-
ing and storing ratings, on which content-based methods
rely, also poses a serious privacy risk for the customers: rat-
ings may be very personal or revealing, and thus highly pri-
vacy sensitive. Service providers could process the collected
rating data for other purposes, sell them to third parties
or fail to provide adequate physical security. In this paper,
we propose technological mechanisms to protect the privacy
of individuals in a recommender system. Our proposal is
founded on homomorphic encryption, which is used to ob-
scure the private rating information of the customers from
the service provider. While the user’s privacy is respected by
the service provider, by generating recommendations using
encrypted customer ratings, the service provider’s commer-
cially valuable item-item similarities are protected against
curious entities, in turn. Our proposal explores simple and
efficient cryptographic techniques to generate private recom-
mendations using a server-client model, which neither relies
on (trusted) third parties, nor requires interaction with peer
users. The main strength of our contribution lies in provid-
ing a highly efficient solution without resorting to unrealistic
assumptions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data Encryption]: Public key cryptosystems
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1. INTRODUCTION
Statistics show that e-commerce has exhibited rapid growth
in the last decade [15]. According to analysts, the Internet
presents a great place for customers to make a good deal as
it is quite easy to compare prices from several retailers. To
further increase their revenue, retailers have been successful
in personalizing purchases by focusing on individuals rather
than crowds. In particular, customer profiles are created
and shopping patterns of customers are collected to be used
in smart algorithms that generate a set of products, which
are likely to be purchased by a target customer.
Among many algorithms, collaborative and content-based
filtering techniques [1] have been proven effective in gener-
ating accurate recommendations for the customers. While
collaborative filtering is based on similarity computations
using ratings of multiple customers, content based filtering
techniques are based on information on the items. In other
words, a recommendation is generated for a particular cus-
tomer by observing the characteristics of the previously pur-
chased products [23]. Content-based recommendation is by
far the most used recommendation system in practice and
used by well-known providers such as Amazon.com, where
each of user’s purchased and rated items are matched to sim-
ilar items rather than matching the user to similar customers
[17].
To improve the prediction accuracy, the retailers collect
as much customer data as possible. While the benefits of
personalized recommendations for the customers and the
business are obvious, the collected data also create serious
privacy risks for the individuals [22]. The service provider
can easily identify and track individuals, especially when the
collected data are combined with other publicly available re-
sources, process the data for other purposes, transfer or sell
them to third parties, or fail to provide adequate physical
security. Consequences of either case will severely damage
the privacy of the customers.
1.1 Related Work
The need for privacy protection for e-commerce, particu-
larly those using collaborative filtering techniques, triggered
research efforts in the past years. Among many different
approaches, two main directions, which are based on data
perturbation [2] and cryptography [16], have been investi-
gated primarily in literature. Polat and Du in [20, 21] sug-
gest hiding the personal data statistically, which has been
proven to be an insecure approach [26]. Shokri et al. present
a recommender system that is built on distributed aggre-
gation of user profiles, which suffers from the trade-off be-
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tween privacy and accuracy [24]. McSherry and Mironov
proposed a method using differential privacy, which has a
similar trade-off between accuracy and privacy [18]. Cisse´e
and Albayrak present an agent system where trusted soft-
ware and secure environment are required [7]. Atallah et
al. proposed a privacy-preserving collaborative forecasting
and benchmarking to increase the reliability of local fore-
casts and data correlations using cryptographic techniques
[3]. Canny also presents cryptographic protocols to gener-
ate recommendations based on matrix projection and factor
analyses, both of which suffer from a heavy computational
and communication overhead [5, 6]. Erkin et al. propose
more efficient protocols based on cryptographic techniques
like homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party com-
putation for recommender systems based on collaborative
filtering [9, 11, 10]. However, in their proposals, the users
are actively involved in the computations, which makes the
overall construction more vulnerable to timeouts and laten-
cies in the users’ connections. In [12], Erkin et al. propose
a cryptographic protocol that does not require active par-
ticipation of the users, however the involvement of a semi-
trusted third party in the protocol is necessary.
1.2 Our Contribution
Our goal in this paper is to present a privacy-preserving
version of a content-based recommender system within a re-
alistic business model, which is practical for real-world use.
In our scenario, a target customer provides his/her ratings
to the service provider, which possesses an item-item sim-
ilarity matrix. A recommendation for a target product is
then generated as a weighted average of the products that
the customer rated in the past. While the ratings of the
customer are privacy-sensitive, the item-item similarity ma-
trix of the service provider is commercially valuable, and
thus, both should be kept private for their respective own-
ers. Our proposal is to use homomorphic encryption [13]
to realize linear operations on the encrypted data. Using
homomorphic encryption provides privacy for the customer
as his/her private data become inaccessible to the service
provider, which does not have the decryption key. The ser-
vice provider can still generate recommendations, but does
this blindly, by performing homomorphic operations on the
encrypted data. However, using cryptographic techniques,
particularly homomorphic encryption, introduce a consider-
able overhead in terms of computation and communication
cost compared with the recommender systems with plain
text data. This makes the privacy-preserving version of the
algorithms impractical to use in real life. To improve the
state-of-the-art so that the private recommendations can be
generated more efficiently compared to existing work, we
propose a cryptographic protocol for generating private rec-
ommendations using content-based filtering by taking the
following aspects into account.
• We define our privacy requirements carefully. Consider
that in previous works, private data, that is customer
ratings and the final recommendations, and in some
cases the intermediate values of the algorithms, are
kept secret from the retailer by means of encryption.
This is a valid requirement for preserving privacy in
several recommender systems. However, if recommen-
dations are generated for an e-commerce application,
the next natural step for the customer is to purchase
an item. If we assume the purchase history as in Ama-
zon.com or the browser history as in YouTube to be
known to the retailer, it is not necessary to hide the
information that an item is rated, or visited, but the
rating for that item should be protected. This assump-
tion, where it holds, can help us to improve the effi-
ciency significantly as there will be less values to be
encrypted. In the case where visited items and the
ratings are correlated, the ratings for all items, includ-
ing the non-rated items, should be encrypted.
• A number of previous works such as [12] considers us-
ing a semi-trusted third party to be involved in the
cryptographic protocol so that recommendations can
be generated even when the users are off-line. How-
ever, it is not easy to find such entities in business.
Therefore, we consider a realistic e-commerce applica-
tion scenarios, which is based on a server-client busi-
ness model that does not involve any trusted third
party.
• We reduce the high cost of working in the encrypted
domain significantly by using look-up tables and data
packing, and avoiding expensive operations on the en-
crypted data such as secure comparison [12].
While our work is certainly not the first to tackle this topic,
we believe that the proposed techniques in this paper are ap-
pealing due to their simplicity, few assumptions and no need
for any trusted third parties. The resulting cryptographic al-
gorithm performs considerably well due to its simplicity and
realistic assumptions. The complexity analysis and experi-
mental results show that our proposal improves the state-of-
the-art in Signal Processing in the Encrypted Domain one
step further.
1.3 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. We describe our se-
curity assumptions, explain homomorphic encryption and
summarize our notation in Section 2. After a brief intro-
duction to content based filtering, we present three privacy-
preserving versions of the filtering algorithm in Section 3.
We also present the complexity analyses along with a se-
curity discussion in this section. We show the result of our
experiments and compare our results with the previous work
in Section 4. We conclude our paper in Section 5.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe our security assumptions, briefly
introduce homomorphic encryption and present the notation
used in this paper.
2.1 Security Assumptions
We build our protocol on the semi-honest, also known as
honest-but-curious, model. This assumption is realistic in
the sense that retailers have a business reputation, which
they do wish to protect by performing the required service
properly, in this case generating recommendations. We as-
sume that customers are interested in getting proper recom-
mendations by providing valid ratings for the products that
are presented in the system. Moreover, the actions of cus-
tomers are limited by the software provided by the service
provider, e.g. a browser plug-in or an applet. Obviously, we
neglect attacks by third parties, assuming that the commu-
nication channels between the service provider and the cus-
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tomers are secured end-to-end using technologies like IPSec
or SSL/TLS [8].
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
The Paillier cryptosystem presented in [19] is additively
homomorphic. This means that there exists an operation
over the cipher texts Epk (m1) and Epk (m2) such that the
result of that operation corresponds to a new cipher text
whose decryption yields the sum of the plain text messages
m1 and m2:
Dsk (Epk (m1) · Epk (m2)) = m1 +m2 . (1)
As a consequence of additive homomorphism, exponenti-
ation of any cipher text yields the encrypted product of the
original plain text and the exponent:
Dsk (Epk (m)
e) = m · e . (2)
Given message m ∈ Zn, Paillier encryption is defined as:
Epk (m, r) = g
m · rn mod n2 , (3)
where n is a product of two large primes p and q, g is a
generator of order n and r is a random number in Z∗n. The
tuple (g, n) is the public key. For decryption and further
details, we refer readers to [19].
The Paillier cryptosystem is probabilistic. This is partic-
ularly important for encryption of plain texts within a small
range. We denote the cipher text of a message m by [[m]]
and omit the key for the sake of simplicity.
2.3 Notation
We summarize our notation in Table 1.
3. PRIVACY-PRESERVING RECOMMENDER
SYSTEM
In this section, we first summarize the content based rec-
ommender system algorithm on plain text data and then
describe the privacy-preserving version in detail.
3.1 Content-based Recommender System Al-
gorithm
We assume that Alice, as a user in the recommender sys-
tem, has a preference vector ~p of dimension L, which con-
tains M < L positive ratings on content items. The re-
maining, non-rated items have preference value zero. Bob,
the service provider, holds an item-item similarity matrix S
of size L × L, whose elements are the similarity measures
between item i and item j, denoted by s(i,j). To generate
recommendations for Alice, we follow the following proce-
dure.
• Alice sends ~p = (p1, p2, . . . , pL) to Bob.
• Bob finds the set of similar items I to the rated items
in ~p using similarity matrix S . Bob creates this set
by selecting the items that have a similarity to every
rated item in ~p above a threshold δ.
• For every item i ∈ I, which has N items in total, Bob
generates recommendation as follows:
ri =
∑M
m=1 pm · s(i,m)∑M
m=1 s(i,m)
, (4)
assuming that Alice has her ratings pi for i ∈ 1, . . . ,M .
• Bob sends the ratings vector ~r for ri ∈ I and the set
I to Alice.
In the above algorithm, there are mainly three types of
data that require protection with regard to privacy: Alice’s
preference vector, Bob’s item-item similarity matrix and the
generated recommendations. Notice that the dimension of
~p is L, which is a large number for a typical recommender
system. It is natural for Alice not to rate all of the items
but a small fraction. In fact, this preference vector is mostly
sparse, approximately 99% in the mostly used research data
sets such as MovieLens. Moreover, due to the way online
applications work, the service provider has (partial) infor-
mation on the seen items, e.g. by observing the visited pages
or past purchases. Besides, Bob suggests recommendations
on a known set of items. Because of these observations, Al-
ice’s privacy depends on hiding her taste, that is her liking
or disliking a particular item, and the content of the recom-
mendations rather than keeping the rated items secret.
While Alice’s taste and final recommendations are privacy-
sensitive, the item-item matrix S is commercially valuable
for Bob. S cannot be made public or sent to Alice to gener-
ate recommendations since this will destroy Bob’s business.
In the following sections, we describe a cryptographic mech-
anism to protect the content of Alice’s preferences, the item-
item similarity matrix and the generated recommendations.
3.2 Privacy-Preserving Algorithm (PPA)
We assume that Alice has a Paillier key pair and is capa-
ble of performing encryption and decryption. The privacy-
preserving version of the content-based recommender system
described before works as follows.
1. Alice encrypts the non-zero elements of ~p, which are in
total M elements, where M  L, using her public key
and sends them to Bob: [[~p]] = ([[p1]], [[p2]], . . . , [[pM ]]).
We assume that Alice rates the first M items for the
sake of simplicity.
2. Bob creates I, the set of similar items by selecting
items in S that have s(i,j) > δ for each pi. We assume
that I has N items, where N = L −M in the worst
case.
3. Bob computes a weighted sum for item i ∈ I.
[[wi]] =
M∏
m=1
[[pm]]
s(i,m) =
[[
M∑
m=1
pm · s(i,m)
]]
, (5)
where we scale and round s(i,m) to an integer of size k
bits to enable calculating in the encrypted domain.
4. Bob also computes the sum of similarities for item i:
vi =
M∑
m=1
s(i,m) . (6)
5. Bob sends Alice [[~w]] = ([[w1]], [[w2]], . . . , [[wN ]]) and ~v =
(v1, v2, . . . , vN ).
6. Alice decrypts [[~w]] and computes recommendations:
ri =
wi
vi
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} . (7)
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Table 1: Symbols and their descriptions.
L Number of items S item-item similarity matrix
I Set of similar items N Number of items in I
M Number of Alice’s ratings s(i,j) similarity between items i and j
~p Alice’s rating vector pi i
th element of ~p
ri Recommendation for item i δ Threshold
~w Vector of weighted sums wi Weighted sum for item i
~v Vector of sums of similarities vi Sum of similarities for item i
k bit length of ratings and scaled similarities n Paillier message space
w˜ Packed weighted sums ∆ Bit length of weighted sums
Ne Number of encryptions to pack all wi’s [[m]] Encryption of m
While the above algorithm is straightforward to apply in
the encrypted domain, there are a number of challenges in
realization, considering performance. Recall that Alice en-
crypts her preferences using the Paillier cryptosystem, which
introduces a considerable data expansion: a 4-bit rating
turns into a 2048-bit cipher text by using a key of size 1024-
bits for a modest security level. Therefore, computation of
encrypted [[wi]] becomes computationally expensive since it
involves exponentiations of large numbers, which creates a
serious performance concern for applying this algorithm in
real life. The size of I also creates additional computational
and communication overhead since the number of similar
items in a real system can be in the order of thousands.
Generating recommendations for a large set of items can
thus become overwhelming for Bob. Moreover, transmission
of these N recommendations, each encrypted separately, re-
quires high bandwidth. Therefore, we investigate techniques
to reduce the computational and communication costs of the
above algorithm taking these observations into account.
3.2.1 Look-up Table (PPA-LUT)
Assuming that Alice has M rated items, generating N
recommendations under encryption is computationally ex-
pensive for Bob. To improve the performance in terms of
computation, we can use a look-up table. Consider Eq. (4)
and the following recommendations:
r1 = p1 · s(1,1) + p2 · s(1,2) + . . .+ pM · s(1,M)
r2 = p1 · s(2,1) + p2 · s(2,2) + . . .+ pM · s(2,M)
. . .
rN = p1 · s(N,1) + p2 · s(N,2) + . . .+ pM · s(N,M) , (8)
where we omit the denominator. Alice’s preferences are mul-
tiplied with different s(i,j), which are positive k-bit inte-
gers. Recall that multiplications turn into intensive expo-
nentiations in the encrypted domain as given in Equation
5. To simplify the computations, Bob can create a look-
up table for Alice. For this purpose, Bob computes [[pi]]
j for
j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k} for every pi and replaces the appropriate val-
ues for the computation of recommendations. It is clear that
to generate N recommendations, Bob should only compute
M · 2k exponentiations over mod n2 rather than M · N ex-
ponentiations. Moreover, this exponentiations can be imple-
mented as a chain of multiplications since [[p]]j = [[p]] · [[p]]j−1.
3.2.2 Data Packing (PPA-LUT/DP)
After Bob generates [[wi]] for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, he sends
them to Alice. However, we can deploy data packing as in
[4, 25, 10] to reduce the communication costs. Data packing
is quite useful considering that generated recommendations
in a typical recommender systems are only a few bits and the
message space for public key cryptosystems is much larger,
e.g. n = 1024 bits for Paillier with a modest key size. There-
fore, packing multiple values in a single encryption is ben-
eficial when operations in the subsequent steps are planned
carefully.
Bob packs the [[wi]]’s as given in Algorithm 1, where ∆ =
2k+log(M) is the bit-length of the compartments in w˜ as ∆
is the maximum bit-length of wi’s. At the end of this compu-
tation, Bob will have the packed sums: w˜ = wN | . . . |w2|w1,
where | denotes the concatenation. Then, Bob sends the
packed recommendations to Alice as before.
Algorithm 1 Packing weighted sums.
w˜ = wN
for i = 1 to N do
[[w˜]] ←= [[w˜]]2
∆
· [[wN−i]] = [[w˜ · 2
∆ + wN−i]] ,
end for
In the above data packing procedure, we assumed that all
of the N weighted sums fit in a single encryption. Assuming
that s(i,j)’s and pi’s are both k = 4 bits and Alice has M =
64 ratings, the bit-length of w is ∆ = 2k + log(M) = 14
bits. It is obvious that this number depends on M which is
the number of rated elements in ~p. Moreover, Bob generates
N recommendations, meaning that N ·∆ bits are needed in
total. Thus, Ne = dN · ∆/ne encryptions will be used to
pack all of the wi’s. So in our example Ne = 1 whenever
N ≤ 73. In practice, Bob can fine-tune the parameters M,
N and δ to generate a desired number of recommendations
and obtain a sufficient performance.
3.3 Complexity
The complexity of the proposed mechanism for generat-
ing private recommendations for Alice depends on the op-
erations on the encrypted data. We assume that the cost
of operations in the plain domain is negligible. In Table 2,
we present the number of operations for encryption, decryp-
tion, multiplication and exponentiation for Alice and Bob for
three versions of the privacy-preserving recommender sys-
tem. Note that exponentiation with a k-bit number takes
roughly 1.5k multiplications. We also give the communica-
tion cost in the number of encryptions to be transmitted.
From Table 2, we see that using a look-up table reduces
the complexity significantly. On the other hand, while data
packing reduces the communications cost, it also introduces
an extra computational burden to Bob.
The protocol we presented in this paper has only one
round of interaction, which means Alice sends her prefer-
80
Table 2: Complexity of the privacy-preserving recommender system.
PPA1 PPA-LUT2 PPA-LUT/DP3
Alice Bob Alice Bob Alice Bob
Encryption M - M - M -
Decryption N - N - Ne -
Multiplication - N · (M − 1) - M(N + 2k)−N - N(M + 2k) +N(∆ + 1)
Exponentiation - N ·M - - - -
Communication M N M N M Ne
1 PPA: Privacy-Preserving Algorithm
2 PPA-LUT: Privacy-Preserving Algorithm with Look-Up Table
3 PPA-LUT/DP: Privacy-Preserving Algorithm with Look-Up Table and Data Packing
ences and gets values from Bob to compute the recommen-
dations herself.
3.4 Security Discussion
Our cryptographic protocol is based on the semi-honest se-
curity model that assumes Alice and Bob follow the protocol
steps. Assuming that the communication between Alice and
Bob is secured, meaning that any third party is prevented
from intervening, we focus on analyzing whether our privacy
requirements are satisfied. Note that our security assump-
tions only rely on the security of the cryptosystem, namely
Paillier, and do not rely on any other security assumptions.
Recall that our goal is to hide Alice’s preferences and final
recommendations from Bob and Bob’s item-item similarity
matrix from Alice. Alice, who has the decryption key, en-
crypts her preference vector using the Paillier cryptosystem,
which is semantically secure [19]. This means that Bob can-
not observe the content of the encryptions even though Al-
ice has ratings in a small range. Bob computes the weighted
sums under encryption using the secure Paillier cryptosys-
tem. This guarantees the secrecy of the generated recom-
mendations towards Bob.
We have only one aspect to consider regarding the security
of our protocol: can Alice deduce meaningful information on
Bob’s item-item similarity matrix by having ~p, w and v in
clear text? It is clear from Eq. (4) that for M ·N unknowns
(s(i,j)’s), Alice has onlyM pi’s, N v’s and N w’s. Therefore,
it is not possible for Alice to solve this linear system with 2N
equations and M ·N unknowns without further information
as long as M > 2.
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We implemented the three versions of the privacy-preserving
content-based recommender system: PPA, PPA-LUT and
PPA-LUT/DP using C++ and GMP Library on a Linux
machine with 64-bit microprocessor and 16 GB of RAM,
running Suse 10.3. We created a synthetic data set and
conducted our experiments using different parameters to
test the performance of the three versions. Note that the
cryptographic protocol has a complexity linear to the num-
ber of items in the data set, therefore we just focus on the
choice of parameters and analyze the performance of these
three versions considering run-time and bandwidth using the
synthetic data set. Another important issue to consider is
that our experiments provide numerical results for the worst
case scenario, where Alice receives recommendations for the
whole set of items. In a real deployment, much smaller set
of items is recommended, meaning that the efficiency of the
cryptographic protocol will be better, as discussed later in
this section.
4.1 Run-time
Figure 1 shows the run-time of each implementation based
on the parameters given in Table 3. We assume that Al-
ice has rating from 1 to 10 and similarities are scaled and
rounded to integers in the same range. Therefore, k is set to
4 bits. For our test, we assume that Alice has ratings for 98%
of items as given in Table 3. We consider the worst case and
assume that Bob generates N = L −M recommendations
for Alice, thus δ is not considered.
Our experiments show that PPA-LUT outperforms the
other two with a run-time of 40 minutes with 102 400 items.
As in shown in complexity analysis in Section 3.3, using data
packing requires Bob to perform more operations on the en-
crypted data but demands less bandwidth for Bob and less
computation for Alice. In PPA-LUT/DP, only packing 102
400 encrypted recommendations takes approximately 46% of
the whole computation. This percentage increases to 96%
for 1024 recommendations, where generating recommenda-
tions are less expensive compared to packing. As a con-
clusion, the choice between PPA-LUT and PPA-LUT/DP
highly depends on the processing power and available band-
width in a real deployment.
Compared to previous works, our results are highly promis-
ing to deploy in real life. Note that in our experiments, we
generate recommendations for the whole data set, which is
not the case in practice. Generating recommendations for a
small set of items chosen by Bob has a run-time in the order
of milliseconds since Bob only needs to create a very small
look-up table of size M ·2k and generate a number of recom-
mendations using inexpensive multiplications over mod n2.
For example consider the case where Alice has 2048 rat-
ings out of 102 400 available items in the system. It takes
Bob only 610 milliseconds to create the look-up table and
16 milliseconds to generate a single recommendation. Thus,
for a common recommender system that generates 10-100
recommendations, the run-time of the privacy-preserving al-
gorithm is 0.16 to 1.6 seconds. These numbers can be im-
proved even further in a real system as our proposal consists
of operations that are highly parallelizable.
To the best our knowledge, our proposal is the first privacy-
preserving content-based recommender systems. Therefore,
we only provide experimental results from related works,
which are based on collaborative filtering techniques that
involve computing similarities among users and items. It
takes 135 seconds in [11] and 75 seconds in [10] to generate
recommendations for a recommender system with 10 000
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Table 3: Parameters.
L M ∆ in bits, for PPA-LUT/DP Ne for PPA-LUT/DP
1024 32 13 13
5120 128 15 75
10240 512 17 171
51200 1024 18 915
102400 2048 19 1933
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Figure 1: Run-time of privacy-preserving algorithm
(PPA), with look-up table (PPA-LUT) and with
look-up table and data packing (PPA-LUT/DP) in
the worst-case scenario.
users and 1000 items. In [5], it takes longer time, roughly
15 hours as stated by the authors, to generate recommen-
dations. However, [6, 5] are based on the malicious security
model and thus the authors use computationally more ex-
pensive cryptographic techniques like commitment schemes
and zero-knowledge proofs [14].
4.2 Bandwidth
The three versions of the recommender systems we present
in this paper are one round protocols: Alice sends her en-
crypted preferences and receives encrypted weighted sums.
No further communication between Alice and Bob is re-
quired. Therefore, Alice sends M encryptions in either ver-
sion and receives N in PPA and PPA-LUT and Ne encryp-
tions in PPA-LUT/DP as given in Table 2. For the experi-
mental setting with 102 400 items, Alice should send M · 2n
bits, which is equal to 512 KB. Bob sends back either 25 MB
or 484 KB of data, depending on the choice of PPA-LUT and
PPA-LUT/DP. Recall that these numbers are based on the
worst-case scenario. In a real setting, Bob sends much less
recommendations to Alice.
The bandwidth requirement of our proposals is signifi-
cantly smaller than [10, 11, 5]. [11] proposes a method that
requires Alice and Bob to transmit 8 KB and 1.8 GB of data,
respectively. Similarly, Alice and Bob transmit 88 MB and
168 MB of data, respectively, in [10].
5. CONCLUSION
Customization of purchases in e-commerce provides ad-
vantage to the retailers to increase their revenue. As a simple
and effective method, content-based recommender systems
have been widely used in business. Like other techniques,
content-based recommender systems rely on customer’s pref-
erences, which can be highly privacy sensitive and open to
misuse by even the retailer itself. We believe that it is pos-
sible to protect customers’ private data without disrupting
the service by using homomorphic encryption. In our pro-
posal, we encrypt the customer’s private data and provide a
privacy-preserving version of the recommender system with
which the retailer can generate recommendations as usual.
We minimize the overhead introduced by working in the en-
crypted domain by employing look-up tables, which replaces
expensive operations on the encrypted data, and data pack-
ing. Our proposal is suitable for business as it is built on
the server-client model and does not require any third par-
ties, which is a difficult requirement to fulfill in the real-
world. The numerical results show that privacy-preserving
content-based recommender system is highly efficient even
in the worst case scenario with more than 100 000 items,
in which the retailer generates a single recommendation in
16 milliseconds. Within a realistic setting, where reasonable
amount of recommendations are generated per customer, our
proposal presents a very efficient method to generate private
recommendations.
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